

FUSING DATA INTO A BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT FOR THE COMMANDER

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Targeting Decisions Affect Wet Gap Crossing

It was a rainy Sunday morning during the corps warfighter exercise. After 72 hours of deliberate targeting against the enemy, the commanding general asked his staff during the targeting decision board (TDB) if the corps had set conditions for the divisions to conduct their wet gap crossing (WGX). The corps commander looked to the G-2 for an assessment. The G-2 targeting officer (G-2T) and fire support coordinator briefed the overall strength of the enemy and assessed the combat systems removed from the battlefield, but they did not provide an assessment of targeting's overall effects on the enemy's ability to affect the WGX. Based on the number of combat systems removed from the battlefield, the commanding general ordered the division to begin the WGX.

At 0400, the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) ordered the Multi-Role Bridge Company from the Brigade Engineer Battalion to bridge two 107-meter gaps across the river to enable the division's crossing. The Multi-Role Bridge Company immediately received indirect fire from enemy 9A52s and 2S19s belonging to the 20th Integrated Fires Command (IFC), causing heavy casualties and destroying the bridging assets. Additionally, 2S6M air defense artillery (ADA) systems protecting enemy defenses near the WGX destroyed six AH-64 Apache helicopters supporting 1st ABCT. The corps deputy commanding general for maneuver, who controlled the fight from the tactical command post (CP), ordered 1st ABCT to cease crossing operations and to establish a hasty defense while the division attempted to destroy the enemy ADA and artillery affecting the WGX. The deputy commanding general for maneuver looked to the G-2 and G-3 for an update. He asked why 1st ABCT and the combat aviation brigade (CAB) received such heavy casualties from enemy artillery and ADA when the staff briefed all 9A52s and 2S6Ms supporting defenses near the WGX were destroyed.

After reevaluating the battle damage assessment (BDA) provided to the commander, the G-2 realized that several factors led to an inaccurate assessment regarding enemy composition, disposition, and capability with respect to the WGX. First, the G-2T incorrectly assessed the number of combat systems removed from the battlefield. He did not account for decoys on the battlefield, and he counted effects on the same 2S6M and 2S19 battery twice because the CAB and the infantry battalion both reported BDA on the same enemy unit. Second, when the G-2T briefed the commanding general on the number of combat systems removed from the battlefield, he did not delineate between those tasked to affect the WGX and those aligned against the other friendly divisions. Finally, nobody provided the commanding general with a description of what enemy capabilities remained on the battlefield and how the enemy could use those capabilities to interrupt the WGX. As a result, based on the way the G-2 section briefed their BDA, the commanding general believed the corps had met its targeting objectives to enable the WGX when, in reality, the enemy retained the capability to halt the division and force them into a hasty defense.

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Introduction

The preceding vignette highlights the importance of accurately analyzing the damage inflicted upon enemy combat systems by friendly targeting efforts and applying that knowledge to holistically assess the enemy's remaining capability to affect friendly operations. Unfortunately, the lack of a standardized BDA process within Army doctrine hinders a unit's ability to develop an effective BDA framework. At present, units rely on individual experience, commander's guidance, and trial and error to train G-2 analysts on how to collect, refine, and assess BDA during large-scale combat operations. This article serves as a supplement to Army doctrine by describing all elements of BDA to help analysts provide commanders with more than just the number of systems removed from the battlefield. It offers recommendations on how to train and organize the G-2T section and highlights the most effective ways to conduct BDA that support both targeting and the commander's decision-making process.

What is Battle Damage Assessment?

BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage against a predetermined target (enemy weapon systems, personnel, or capabilities) caused by lethal or non-lethal military force.¹ BDA is more than counting the number of casualties or pieces of equipment destroyed. BDA helps answer three questions:

- ◆ Did we destroy targets on the commander's high-pay-off target list (HPTL)? This is targeting effectiveness.
- ◆ If so, does the enemy need to adjust combat power to achieve its objective? This is the enemy's counteraction.
- ◆ Do we need to reattack high-payoff targets (HPTs) to set conditions for mission success? This is reattack criteria.

BDA is broken down into three components to help assess effects on a target:²

- ◆ Physical Damage Assessments: What was observed or interpreted? The extent of damage to a target.

Example: 2 of 3 x 2S19s destroyed near Objective (OBJ) X-RAY.

- ◆ Functional Damage Assessments: Can the enemy target perform its intended mission? This interim assessment must include the estimated time it will take for the enemy to replace or fix the capability.

Example: The remaining 1 x 2S19 vicinity OBJ X-RAY maintains limited capability to effectively target friendly forces at OBJ X-RAY because the enemy cannot mass fires on the WGX. However, 20th IFC can reposition a multiple rocket launcher battalion (MRL BN) within two hours to range the WGX.

- ◆ Target System Assessments: A broad assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness engagements had against an entire target system capability.

Example: While friendly targeting achieved the desired effects against the 2S19s affecting OBJ X-RAY, it did not destroy all the systems the 20th IFC relies upon to support and enable defenses near OBJ X-Ray (CPs, IL220 radars, 9A52s, SA-17s, and 2S6Ms).

Providing an accurate target system assessment is the most critical component to BDA because it helps the commander and staff both to understand the effects against an entire system and to determine if the enemy unit can still accomplish its task. While assessing effects against a target system is a crucial first step toward providing situational understanding, analysts must also understand why BDA is vital to the commander's targeting process. Once analysts understand how BDA supports the targeting process, they can effectively prioritize battle damage reports and use the assessments to develop a shared understanding of the enemy threat.

Why is Battle Damage Assessment Important?

Commanders utilize BDA to visualize the threat and understand whether conditions are set for units to achieve the next phase of the operation. Accurate BDA contributes to the commander's understanding of risk and assists with identifying windows of opportunity for exploitation. It is a critical component within the commander's decision-making process,

and it requires the G-2 section to provide more than just the assessed number of combat systems destroyed.

BDA must contribute to the commander's understanding of the threat by providing an estimate of remaining enemy capabilities and their ability to disrupt friendly operations in conjunction with a description of how friendly targeting disrupted the enemy's course of action, intentions, and decision-making cycle.³ When assessing the enemy's remaining critical capabilities, analysts must account for decoys, over reporting, force displacement, and enemy reconstitution or reinforcements to provide an accurate assessment and to refine deliberate targeting operations. Additionally, analysts must assess how long effects of targeting will last. For example, destruction of all 9A52s supporting the battle zone may only provide an 8-hour window before the enemy reinforces the IFC. The commander needs to understand this time constraint to either adjust the operational tempo or to maneuver forces to exploit the opportunity created through targeting.

Limited resources available to units and commanders during large-scale combat operations require detailed information and assessments to enable the best use of all available combat power. Understanding the commander's objectives and desired end state is a critical step to effective collection management, targeting, and BDA.⁴ Staffs cannot effectively decide what HPTs to collect against, destroy, and assess in time and space to support the commander's objectives if they do not clearly understand the desired end state. If the G-2 and staff only report numbers and fail to provide an assessment that helps the commander to visualize the threat, the commander will not be able to effectively allocate resources or to determine whether reengagement of HPTs is necessary.

Establishing the G-2 Targeting Section

Successful units support the commander's decision-making process by effectively organizing the targeting enterprise for combat, utilizing a clearly defined BDA framework and routinely exercising these processes with the same personnel. This begins with organizing the G-2T section.

Although corps and division G-2 sections understand the significance of conducting accurate BDA, they typically do not allocate sufficient personnel, training, or systems to achieve the required level of accuracy and analysis to inform targeting and decision making. Because there is a 35F, Intelligence Analyst, personnel shortage across the Army intelligence enterprise, G-2T sections typically consists of only two to four Soldiers to perform BDA. These analysts often lack sufficient training on the targeting process, the enemy's order of battle, and the unit's approach to BDA to be successful. To build an effective targeting team, the G-2 must first identify Soldiers to serve as BDA analysts and ensure they remain in the position throughout the unit's training and deployment cycle.




Figure 1. Establishing a G-2 Targeting Section

The targeting section concept depicted in Figure 1 is a way both to establish a G-2T section at a corps or division and to synchronize its efforts with the functional brigades. Once established, units must develop a plan to train targeting section analysts on the following:

- ◆ Enemy order of battle and critical capabilities.
- ◆ Unit methodology for reporting, tracking, and assessing BDA at echelon.
- ◆ Data management tools and processes.
- ◆ BDA's contribution to targeting and situational understanding.

While the G-2T is responsible for the overall management of the BDA common intelligence picture and targeting process, the division artillery or field artillery brigade and the CAB S-2s have responsibilities to submit BDA to higher and analyze the enemy artillery and ADA threat. Synchronizing these efforts provides greater analysis on critical enemy capabilities that threaten the unit's operations since the CAB and division artillery S-2's expertise and primary focus are on those threats. However, to ensure these units fully understand their roles and functions in support of targeting and the BDA process, the G-2 must also clearly define their roles and responsibilities in the G-2 and division tactical standard operating procedures. Once the G-2 section establishes


roles and responsibilities, it must standardize BDA reporting formats and timings to streamline the process and prevent double counting or gaps in physical damage reporting to the greatest extent possible.

Battle Damage Assessment Reporting Requirements

BDA reporting is fast paced and can quickly overwhelm an analyst if procedures are not established, disseminated in orders, and adhered to by all units and enablers within the unit's area of operation. Accepting multiple BDA reporting formats increases the risk of duplicate battle damage reports, creating over reporting and inaccurate assessments. Units should implement a standardized automation process to ingest reports (C104 and C119 BDA reports) in the Distributed Common Ground System-Army and create a BDA tracker that at a minimum includes the following:

- ◆ Date-time group and mission number.
- ◆ Enemy unit, either assessed or confirmed.
- ◆ Military Grid Reference System coordinates. This helps with unit correlation and where effects occurred on the battlefield.
- ◆ Tasked detection and delivery asset. This ensures tasking of assets for BDA.
- ◆ The unit who reported BDA, to include a point of contact if further clarification is required.

- While trackers, such as the one depicted in Figure 2, help consolidate data for the G-2T analysts to process, BDA charts also help analysts to describe effects achieved on enemy capabilities. For example, whether the unit destroyed an entire target system capability killing friendly formations and what critical capabilities remain. These charts help refine targeting and set conditions for current and future operations. These products should be standalone and used as briefing tools in the targeting working group (TWG). BDA charts should also provide enough detail for the commander and staff to inform their decisions. All BDA products must have a date-time group to prevent the staff from using obsolete data when developing assessments. Additionally, units must establish a PACE⁵ plan to disseminate the reports promptly.



Battle Damage Assessment Working Group

Once battle damage reports are processed, units normally do not have a working group or system to refine BDA with subordinate units and higher headquarters. Often, the G-2 discusses BDA during the G-2 Synch or TWG because there are already too many meetings and not enough time for work. While this avoids creating another forum, these meetings do not provide ample time to review BDA discrepancies, remaining BDA requirements, and future operations that require BDA collection. Successful units conduct BDA working groups that meet before the TWG and TDB to allow enablers to refine assessments of the enemy's strength, of the impacts on the enemy commander's critical capabilities (i.e., HPTs) and systems, and of the enemy commander's reaction based off achieved targeting effects. Additionally, the BDA working group enables the collection manager to synchronize collection assets before the TWG for BDA, reattack requirements, or target development based on physical and functional damage assessments. Synchronizing assets and targeting requirements will ensure the unit achieves the required air tasking order (ATO) effects. At a minimum, subordinate unit targeting officers, field artillery intelligence officers, collection enablers, collection managers, and Combined Forces Air Component Command liaison officers must attend the working group to achieve the desired inputs and outputs for the meeting. Figure 3 outlines the intent and purpose of a BDA working group, an example agenda, and inputs and outputs for the meeting. The required outputs include collection requirements and reattack recommendations that feed directly into the subsequent collection management (CM) working group and TWG.

Role of Collection in the Battle Damage Assessment Process

Planning and balancing collection requirements for targeting, BDA, and situational understanding in advance helps ensure assets are available at the required time and location for HPT detection. Additionally, it prevents the unit from dynamically retasking assets to search for HPTs instead of collecting BDA to refine situational understanding.⁶ While tasking assets for BDA collection is vital to understanding the threat, it will limit available assets for target development and acquisition. The CM working group verifies coverage of collection requirements and synchronizes assets for situational understanding, target development, and BDA collection. The working group also helps the G-2 develop indicators for the collection plan prior to collection. This is crucial to timely assessments, especially if observation of the damage or effect is required. Indicators allow analysts to—

- ◆ Identify critical targets quickly.
- ◆ Task resources capable of collecting the required information.

Purpose: Review battle damage to provide accurate assessments that inform the targeting process and the commander's decision making. Intent: Coordinate and deconflict BDA to develop a common intelligence picture (CIP) on division/corps effects to enemy capabilities. Synchronize collection for successful HPT and BDA collection. Identify recommended enemy reattack criteria for TWG based off physical and functional damage assessments to achieve required ATO "Kill Contract" effects. Frequency: 2x daily, prior to TWG and TDB (enable time to make changes to BDA and enemy situation).	
Chair: G-2T or Fusion Chief Lead: G-2T Attendees: ◦ G-2T team (at echelon) ◦ Field Artillery Intelligence Officer ◦ CM ◦ E-MIB (BDA or CM Assessments section) ◦ Targeting enablers (EW, CEMA, Nonlethal, STO etc.) ◦ Fires Targeting Officer ◦ G-35 Representative	
Inputs/Actions: ◦ Review BDA discrepancies at echelon to refine BDA CIP. ◦ Did we achieve BDA effects required for ATO "Kill Contract"? ◦ Was collection focus correct? (Did we find HPTs?) ◦ Recommended adjustments to collection for BDA support. ◦ Recommended reattack criteria to set conditions. Outputs (Feeds TWG and TDB): ◦ BDA common intelligence picture (CIP) at echelon on effects to enemy capabilities (physical / functional assessments). ◦ Recommended collection requirements to support targeting and BDA collection. ◦ Recommendations for reattack based off physical and functional damage assessments. (Did we achieve desired effects and conditions against the enemy?)	
Agenda: SWO: Impacts to planned collection or targeting missions. G-2T (at echelon): Review BDA discrepancies at echelon to refine BDA CIP. (Did we achieve BDA effects?) G-2 Target Officer: 24–48 hour enemy assessment focused on changes that impact agreed upon ATO "Kill Contract." ◦ What effects did we have on enemy capabilities and how will enemy react? G-35: Changes to division/corps mission. G-2 CM/E-MIB: Was collection focus correct? (Did we find HPTs?) ◦ Recommended adjustments to collection for BDA support. G-2T (at echelon): Recommendations for reattack based off physical and functional damage assessments. (Did we achieve desired effects and conditions against the enemy?)	
ATO BDA CEMA CIP CM E-MIB EW G-2T G-35 HPT STO SWO TDB TWG	air tasking order battle damage assessment cyber electromagnetic activities common intelligence picture collection management expeditionary-military intelligence brigade electromagnetic warfare assistant chief of staff, intelligence targeting assistant chief of staff, operations and plans high-payoff target special technical operations staff weather officer targeting decision board targeting working group

Figure 3. Battle Damage Assessment Working Group

- ◆ Identify best collection times.
- ◆ Provide specific changes in activity the sensor should collect.
- ◆ Assess how the change in activity impacts the target's functional status.

Once BDA is collected, the G-2T and Fusion sections conduct analysis to determine if the unit achieved the desired effects from targeting. These results must be discussed in the BDA working group and included in the G-2T's TWG assessment to determine if reattack or adjustments to the collection plan are required.⁷

The example intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance plan in Figure 4 is a method of ensuring adequate coverage for all the collection focus areas. It provides an appropriate allocation of collection assets to support target development, BDA, and situational understanding, as well as a clear identification of collection gaps and risk mitigation measures prior to each TWG and TDB. The collection manager uses the TWG and CM working group to prepare the assessment and collection requirements for the commander and staff in the TDB.

Turning Battle Damage into Combat Assessments for the Commander

Outcomes from the BDA and CM working group assist the G-2T analysts with fusing battle damage reports into detailed assessments that facilitate targeting. The commander's HPTL by phase of the operation clearly delineates enemy capabilities important to the commander and informs analysts what critical enemy capabilities will significantly contribute to the friendly course of action when destroyed.⁸ G-2T analysts must prioritize battle damage reports based on the HPTL and use the data to assess impacts against the enemy. Analysts must also focus on assessing the enemy's remaining critical capabilities. The G-2T must account for decoys, force displacement, and the enemy's ability to reconstitute or reinforce units in order to provide an accurate assessment and to refine deliberate targeting for current and future operations. Similar to the U.S. Army, adversaries will attempt to replace losses in combat power and capability to prevent the loss from disrupting operations.




Figure 4. Example Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Plan

G-2T analyst should develop combat assessment products, like the one shown in Figure 5, that provide the commander with a visual depiction of the effects targeting had on the enemy and how the enemy will react to mitigate or replace the combat losses. These assessments are crucial to helping the commander determine if reengagement is necessary before moving assets for follow-on targeting efforts. These products, along with the G-2's verbal description, must include the critical components of physical damage, functional damage, and target system assessment to inform the commander and staff if the enemy can employ its capabilities to disrupt the mission.⁹

At a minimum, a 24–48-hour combat assessment must include the following details:

- ◆ Effects achieved on enemy capabilities (BDA, account for decoys and over reporting).
- ◆ Targeting impacts to the enemy's course of action and decision making.
- ◆ Enemy's reaction to prevent combat power loss from disrupting their course of action (account for asset displacement and ability to reconstitute or reinforce units).
- ◆ Recommendations for reattack based on shaping requirements and situational understanding. (What enemy capabilities need to be disrupted or destroyed for mission success?)
- ◆ Timeline of when we will achieve conditions against the enemy to enable the commander's decision making and mission success.

The staff uses the assessment to articulate effects against the enemy in time and space, prioritize remaining critical enemy capabilities to target in future ATOs, and adjust the operational timeline, when necessary. The vignette, below, is an example of how combat assessments inform the commander's decisions.




Figure 5. Combat Assessment Tool

Wet Gap Crossing Combat Assessment

Ma'am we have destroyed 1 x MRL BN CP, 2 x 1L219 radars, 18 x 9A52s, 6 x 2S19s, and 3 x 2S6Ms supporting defenses along the wet gap, preventing 20th IFC from massing fires and protecting HTPs near the WGX [What]. We have achieved conditions against the enemy 24 hours earlier than previously assessed to enable 3ID to cross the wet gap. We have approximately 6 hours until OSC-S reinforces defenses with an additional MRL BN and 2S6M company [So What]. Therefore, between now and 1800, 3 CAB will have air superiority to target remaining enemy defenses and the enemy will not be able to mass fires with long range artillery against 3ID [Which Means]. We recommend conducting the WGX in the next 4–6 hours to take advantage of disrupted enemy capabilities and to prevent the enemy from reinforcing their defenses along the WGX with obstacles, artillery, and ADA [Recommendation].

Presenting comprehensive combat assessments that include the what, so what, which means, and recommendation during the TWG and TDB highlight the effects achieved on enemy capabilities and provides a timeframe for how long it will take the enemy to replace the capability. This analysis informs the G-3 of opportunities against the enemy and recommends changes to the operational timeline to synchronize targeting and enable the commander's decisions.

Roles and Responsibilities of the Commander and Staff

The TWG and TDB synchronize all staff efforts in support of the targeting discussed in this article. The TWG supports the TDB by reviewing initial collection requirements, as required, and prioritizing targets based on the commander's guidance during the previous decision board.¹⁰ Critical to the TWG is the integration of crucial targeting enablers at the action officer level that will assist in achieving desired targeting effects. The TWG also determines the targets that require BDA. Units should select only the most critical targets since valuable collection assets and analytic capability must be diverted to perform BDA.

Prior coordination in the BDA and CM working groups will help facilitate discussion and provide the necessary analysis for planning and allocating resources in the TWG. The G-2 section plays a critical role in providing threat assessments of the enemy, allowing other staff sections and enablers to determine how to employ capabilities in support of targeting efforts (See Figure 6, on the next page).

During the TWG, the G-2 should brief the following:¹¹

- ◆ Enemy situation and upcoming assessed enemy decision points (combat assessment).
- ◆ BDA from the previous ATO and its impact on the enemy course of action.
 - ◆ Reattack recommendations, if the unit did not achieve the desired effects.
- ◆ Predictive 24–72-hour assessment of the enemy most likely course of action, most dangerous course of action, and how the enemy will react.
 - ◆ Assessed and confirmed dispositions of the HPTs within the ATO timeline.
- ◆ Recommended changes and updates to the HPTL.
- ◆ Recommended changes to priority intelligence requirements (PIR) for the commander's approval (staff reviewed).
- ◆ Current and proposed changes to the information collection plan.

Once the G-2 section provides its assessment, enablers and staff must provide inputs on integrating their capabilities or resources to support the targeting efforts. Staff sections

and enablers need to apply critical thought and foresight to assist the planning efforts and influence the G-2's assessment. The enemy threat is constantly evolving because of operational variables. If time allows, the G-2 needs to notify the staff regarding critical enemy threat updates before the TDB, especially if it negatively affects the plan developed in the TWG. Units must avoid using the TWG as a rehearsal for the TDB. Doing so prevents enablers and staff sections from brainstorming and synchronizing effects delivered against a target, degrading targeting efforts.

The TDB is one of the few opportunities for the staff to provide the commander with an accurate assessment of the threat and how the unit plans to defeat the enemy and accomplish the mission. The TDB is not an information brief. Instead, the staff receives guidance and decisions from the commander that drive future planning, allocation of resources, and targeting operations. Staffs must use the TDB to seek clarification. Units fail when they do not seek clarification on the commander's guidance. Some commander-level decisions the staff should request are:

- ◆ Approval to reallocate commander's critical assets to support targeting.
- ◆ Changes to the HPTL and/or reprioritizing HPTs.
- ◆ Approval for updated commander's critical information requirements (PIRs and friendly force information requirements).
- ◆ Changes to the operating tempo, if required.

Commanders can be extremely helpful in acquiring additional resources from higher headquarters to achieve desired effects. During the TDB, the staff must articulate support requests for the commander to pursue during their dialogue with the higher headquarters commander. Requests for support should only occur after the staff has completed the "science" behind the request and all staff-to-staff coordination is exhausted.

A running estimate that provides an assessment in time and space is beneficial to help the commander retain the analysis provided during a lengthy TDB. The G-2 Fusion section should be responsible for developing the intelligence running estimate for the commander. While running estimates are based on a commander's preferred method to receive information, the running estimate should include:

- ◆ Enemy combat strength by echelon.
- ◆ Enemy most likely course of action and most dangerous course of action.
- ◆ If the enemy is on plan to achieve the course of action.
- ◆ Risks the enemy poses to friendly force operations.

- ◆ G-2's recommended focus against the enemy.
- ◆ Future enemy decision points by ATO.

Accurate BDA and communication between enablers and subordinate units will help ensure estimates provide necessary analysis for the commander to visualize the threat.

Conclusion

The fast and constantly evolving environment during large-scale combat operations requires well-trained analysts with systems in place to quickly capture and analyze data that refine assessments to support targeting and the commander's decision making. Similar to friendly force combat slants, BDA will never be 100 percent accurate. Nevertheless, successful units develop a BDA framework that assist with the commander's visualization of the threat to make informed decisions and synchronize operations. When units employ a comprehensive BDA process that incorporates the key ideas and recommendations discussed in this article, commanders will more effectively visualize the threat, allocate resources, and adjust friendly operations to mitigate risk and exploit opportunities. 🌟

The G-2 supports the targeting process by...

- **Decide—"What are my targets?"**
 - Targeting working group products.
 - High-payoff targets to target in time and space.
 - Effects on enemy capabilities (battle damage assessment).
 - Updates to enemy course of action and decisive points.
 - Recommended reattack criteria.
- **Detect—"Where are my targets?"**
 - Collection management working group synchronizes collection to find and fix.
 - High-payoff targets based on guidance from targeting working group/tactical database.
 - PED analysts send targets to field artillery intelligence officer for execution.
- **Assess—"Did we achieve our effects?"**
 - Battle damage assessment helps determine enemy's combat effectiveness and remaining capabilities.
 - Is reengagement necessary before moving to the next objective?
 - Helps G-3 manage operating tempo.
 - Opportunities to exploit success.
 - Delay operations based on reattack requirements.

ELINT	electronic intelligence
FFAHQ	free-fire area headquarters
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-2T	assistant chief of staff, intelligence targeting
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations
GMTI	ground moving target indicator
JAGIC	joint air-ground integration center
NTISR	nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
PED	processing exploitation, and dissemination
TVA	technical vulnerability assessment




Figure 6. G-2 Support to Targeting Process

Endnotes

1. Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-60, *Targeting* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office [GPO], 07 May 2015), 2-14.
2. *Ibid.*, 2-15.
3. *Ibid.*, 2-14–2-15.
4. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3162.02, *Methodology for Combat Assessments* (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 08 March 2019), B-1.
5. A PACE plan establishes primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency methods of communications for each warfighting function, typically from higher to lower echelons. Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 16 May 2022), 6-8.
6. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-60, *Joint Targeting* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 28 September 2018), D-3.
7. Department of the Army, ATP 3-60, *Targeting*, 2-15.
8. *Ibid.*, 2-2.
9. *Ibid.*, 2-15.
10. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-60, *Joint Targeting*, III-7.
11. Department of the Army, ATP 3-60, *Targeting*, 4-15.

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