Intelligence Support to Protection: An Approach
by Major Paul Ward

Introduction

Across multiple division and theater-level exercises, the 2nd Infantry Division's intelligence warfighting function is called upon to provide intelligence support to both targeting and protection. Intelligence support to targeting is a mission essential task for the 2nd Infantry Division G-2; however, intelligence support to protection is not. G-2s need to adopt an approach that will help the commander to understand and visualize the operational environment, provide the required support to staff action across all time horizons, and drive the unit's targeting *and* protection processes. This article describes the 2nd Infantry Division G-2's approach to supporting both processes.

Background

Targeting and protection are operationalized through their respective working groups. They result in key outputs that enable staff action (in the case of targeting) and unit and staff action (in the case of protection) at the current operations, future operations, and future plans cells across the time horizons for multiple warfighting functions.

Targeting. Army doctrine provides that "a targeting methodology is a rational and iterative process that methodically analyzes, prioritizes, and assigns assets against targets systematically to create those effects that will contribute to achieving the commander's objectives."[1] The targeting process is operationalized through the targeting working group and decision boards and drives a unit's lethal and nonlethal operations. Two key outputs of the targeting process are the high-value target list (HVTL) and the high-payoff target list (HPTL).

Protection. Army doctrine states that "protection is an important contributor to operational reach. Commanders anticipate how enemy actions and environmental factors might disrupt operations and then determine the protection capabilities required to maintain sufficient reach….The protection warfighting function helps commanders maintain their force's integrity and combat power."[2] Protection is operationalized through the protection working group and helps the commander understand and visualize the risks to the mission and to the force. Key products that support and enable the commander's decision-making process are the critical asset list, defended asset list, and prioritized protection list.

Working Groups. The relationship between the targeting working group and protection working group is an important factor for leaders to understand. Through these two working groups, the staff aids the commander's understanding and visualization of the operational environment, generates decision space, and provides options to allocate and apportion combat power to achieve the end state. Outputs from the targeting working group support the commander's allocation of combat power and effects to remove adversary capabilities from the battlefield. Outputs from the protection working group support the commander's allocation of combat power and effects to mitigate risks to the mission and to the force.

The Role of the Situation Template

The 2nd Infantry Division G-2 relied on the situation template (SITEMP) as the primary product that supported visualization of the adversary and operational environment for the staff integrating elements (referred to as the boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups, or B2C2WGs) for both targeting and protection. Using the division's operational framework, the SITEMP framed the adversary in the division's deep, close, and support areas. A standardized SITEMP that action officers could carry into the B2C2WGs, across multiple command nodes, enabled the G-2 to maintain a consistent analytic narrative and yielded efficiencies given the analytic and manpower constraints with which the 2nd Infantry Division G-2 was operating. Although the SITEMP was an effective product to frame the adversary and operational environment, it was also the responsibility of G-2 action officers to frame the adversary to enable a situational understanding for various staff sections and warfighting functions. Requirements to support the targeting process framed the primary model that the G-2 used across multiple exercises. However, it became apparent that the G-2 needed a slightly different model for intelligence support to protection.

Intelligence Support to Targeting: The Methodology

The 2nd Infantry Division G-2 supported division targeting by focusing on the nature of the adversary, what the adversary was doing, and why the adversary was doing it. How would the adversary employ combat power and lethal effects to accomplish its end state? Given the terrain and friendly combat power and effects, where would the adversary exploit opportunities? Those questions generally focused on the adversary in the division deep and close areas.

With the adversary executing offensive operations, we used the following framework: If the enemy wants to accomplish (end state), then where is the decisive point in the battle?

BLUF: Adversary executes defense-in-depth (area defense) to disrupt friendly forces

Deep Area
- Adversary mobile reserves prepare to execute movement north to commit limited objective attack to disrupt friendly forces attack south and to support 19th AD withdraw under pressure to the south.

Close/Support Area
- Forward adversary division withdraw under pressure to reconstitute.
- Bypassed/remnant units in friendly forces support zone conduct harassing attacks to disrupt friendly forces tempo, targeting primarily logistical convoys, sustainment nodes, and C2 nodes.

Assessment
- FWD division withdraw under pressure/mobile reserves limited objective CATK fails; 19th AD destroyed; 17th MID withdraws.

ADVERSARY HPTL	THREAT	TIME	DIV PPL
Maneuver	Mobile Reserves 122MRL, 152MRL, 170mm, ENY Air	D+1-D+7	1. Bridge 3. Dam
Log	SPF/SOF	D+1-D+7	
C2	SPF/SOF, NPCHEM	D+1-D+7	2. DMAIN
FS	122MRL, 152MRL, 170mm, ENY Air	D+1-D+7	4. C/3-4 Patriot 5. Q-53 (Radar), FDC

Figure 1. Enemy Situation (D+5)

With the adversary executing defensive operations, we used a different framework: If friendly forces execute (end state), then where will the enemy apply combat power and effects to counter? The answer to those questions drove where the adversary would employ its combat power. Using a threat model, we obtained an initial understanding of how the enemy would organize itself and, when overlaid on terrain, this yielded our SITEMP.

To support the targeting process, our starting point to frame the adversary was to identify what the adversary wanted to accomplish, either to achieve its end state or to prevent friendly forces from achieving theirs. This enabled the targeting team to—

- ✦ Identify key capabilities the enemy needed to accomplish its mission.
- ✦ Support the development of the HVTL.
- ✦ Identify the capabilities that the division needed to target to accomplish its mission.
- ✦ Support the development of the HPTL.

Additionally, these questions supported the development of the division's information collection plan and the tasking of the division's organic information collection assets and requests for support from higher headquarters.

Intelligence Support to Protection: The Methodology

The 2nd Infantry Division G-2 supported the division protection cell by focusing on the following questions:

- ✦ What the division was doing and why it was doing it?

- ✦ What combat power and effects did the adversary possess that could counter what the division was doing?

- ✦ Given operational variables, did the adversary possess the ability to deploy those effects against division assets?

- ✦ Where were the operational seams, and did the adversary retain sufficient combat power and effects to exploit?

- ✦ Did those actions, or effects, nest with the adversary's intent and end state?

Those questions generally focused on the adersary in the division close and support areas.

To support protection, our starting point to frame the adversary was to understand and visualize what the division was doing and then to determine if friendly actions overlapped with the adversary's intent, end state, and capabilities. In practice, this meant we built on our understanding of the adversary's composition, disposition, and intent, and we then created an estimated adversary HVTL and HPTL. We overlaid the adversary HVTL and HPTL with the current assessed adversary collection capabilites, combat power, and other capabilities that could be leveraged to engage the friendly targets. We then identified the time horizon that was available for the enemy to prosecute the targets (Figure 1). These actions—

- ✦ Resulted in the creation of a refined and detailed prioritized protection list (Figure 2, on the next page).

- ✦ Provided the commander and staff with a greater understanding of risks to the mission and to the force.

Assessment:
- What happened?
- By who/what (enemy, friendly, weather, etc.)?
- What was the effect?
- Were mitigations in place?
- Were they effective?
- Why or why not?

Mitigation:
- What can be done to prevent or lessen negative effects to the mission?

RECOMMENDED PRIORITY	ASSET	LOCATION	NOTES	REQUIREMENTS	THREAT	MITIGATION	UNIT TASKED
1	Bridge (Wet Gap)	IVO PL CATHY	ISO DO	1x MP CO	SPF	Survivability positions, MP CO securing	26th MEB ✓
2	DMAIN	FAA RAINBOW	C2	1x MP CO	SPF, IDF, Chemical Attack	1x MP CO Organic Avenger & Patriot	3-265 ADA 26th MEB ✓
3	DAM	IVO MENGCHEVIR	Critical Infrastructure	1x MP PLT	ENY Air, IDF, SPF	1x MP PLT Critical Site Security	26th MEB ✓
4	C/3-4 Patriot	IVO DMAIN	Theater Asset	1x MP PLT	SPF, IDF, Chemical Attack	1x MP PLT Organic Avenger System	26th MEB ✓
5	Q-53 (Radar), FDC	IVO PL DAVE	Critical for counter fire	1x MP PLT	ENY Air, IDF, SPF, Jamming	Survivability positions, MP PLT securing	3-265 ADA 26th MEB ✓
6	Sentinel Radar	DMAIN	Critical for air picture	1x IN PLT	ENY Air, IDF, SPF, Jamming	1x MP CO Organic Avenger PLT	3-265 ADA 26th MEB ✓
7	DSA	FAA RAINBOW	C2, Sustainment Node	1x MP CO	SPF, IDF, Chemical Attack	1x MP CO Organic Avenger PLT	3-265 ADA 26th MEB ✓

Figure 2. Prioritized Protection List (D+1)

HPTL: Logistics (Convoy/Nodes), C4I, C2 Nodes
Weather: Low Ceilings, impact to ISR assets

Assessment: The residual risk to D+1 is medium. The greatest risk is the impacts to sustainment and operations with the continued impacts from weather. Bypassed SOF units will target engineer and logistical elements during resupply operations.

Risk:
1. List the risks out by highest risk to mission after mitigation to lowest risk to mission.
Mitigation: List/describe identified and planned mitigations for that specific risk.
2. C/2-56FA may encounter bypassed forces along MSR purple.
Mitigation: B Co. security forces will provide convoy security, and A Co. engineers will have conducted route clearance ahead of time.
3. If possible, try to place markers on the map with numbers to easily visually identify the location of these risks.
Mitigation: If it doesn't crowd the map too much, you can even add visuals of mitigation (unit) locations. Between the two, the risk is more important to depict on the map.

#	ASSET	LOCATION	NOTES	REQUIREMENTS	THREAT	MITIGATION	UNIT TASKED
1	Bridge (Wet Gap)	IVO PL CATHY	ISO DO	1x MP CO	SPF	Survivability positions, MP CO securing	26th MEB
2	DMAIN	FAA RAINBOW	C2	1x MP CO	SPF, IDF, Chemical Attack	1x MP CO Organic Avenger & Patriot	3-265 ADA 26th MEB
3	DAM	IVO MENGCHEVIR	Critical Infrastructure	1x MP PLT	ENY Air, IDF, SPF	1x MP PLT Critical Site Security	26th MEB
4	C/3-4 Patriot	IVO DMAIN	Theater Asset	1x MP PLT	SPF, IDF, Chemical Attack	1x MP PLT Organic Avenger System	26th MEB
5	Q-53 (Radar), FDC	IVO PL DAVE	Critical for counter fire	1x MP PLT	ENY Air, IDF, SPF, Jamming	Survivability positions, MP PLT securing	3-265 ADA 26th MEB

LEGEND
FWD DIV
RESERVES/2ND ECHELON FORCES
SOF
BYPASSED/DESTROYED

Figure 3. Protection COP (D+5)

- Enabled more effective employment of friendly combat power to mitigate risk because the G-2 worked through the process to identify clear time horizons and enemy capabilities that could be brought to bear on friendly forces (Figure 3).
- Ensured that the division's and the major subordinate commands' information collection plans had accounted for protection requirements.

What We Learned

At the beginning of the last year's training cycle, the way that the intelligence warfighting function supported the protection cell was not entirely clear to the protection chief, G-2, or staff. As a result, we experienced some problems throughout multiple exercises. Over the course of four exercises, we learned that we needed an analytic framework with subtle distinctions to support the targeting and protection efforts.

Our initial approach to provide intelligence support to protection was to replicate our support for targeting. However, that analytic model was insufficient for the protection cell because it failed to adequately support the refinement of the division's prioritized protection list, defended asset list, and critical asset list, and it served as an inadequate model to refine risks to the mission and to the force. As a G-2 team, our understanding of intelligence support to protection evolved into a framework that focused on understanding and visualizing a basic question: What are we doing and why? We then overlaid the answer to that question with our understanding of the adversary's composition, disposition, intent, and capabilities.

The development of an adversary HVTL and HPTL was a critical product that enabled us to refine risks to the mission and to the force, which influenced the division prioritized protection list. Without both an HVTL and an HPTL, we made the analytic leap that what the division prioritized on the prioritized protection list was often the adversary's priority. Developing both helped us to draw out the differences and create a more complete protection plan. This more mature

> *It is not enough for military intelligence leaders to talk about the adversary...*

approach to intelligence support to protection enabled the overall protection warfighting function to advance, and it set conditions for broader success across the division's deep, close, and rear operations.

Conclusion

Our experience in supporting the targeting and protection cells over the past year provides additional perspectives to intelligence leaders who are already cognizant of an analytic framework and understand the outputs of the B2C2WG. It is not enough for military intelligence leaders to talk about the adversary while allowing the rest of the staff and other warfighting functions to refine the plan. Rather, it is our responsibility to generate and employ tailored analytic models that drive the whole of staff through the planning process and into execution. How we talk and think about the enemy matters just as much as how we assess the enemy. ✦

Endnotes

1. Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication 3-60, *Targeting* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 7 May 2015), 1-2.

2. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 31 July 2019), 2-10.

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