Planning and Executing Division Intelligence Reach Cell Operations

Recognizing the Requirement

The problem of meeting mission requirements with limited organizational capabilities is an inherent leadership challenge that spans services, branches, and echelons. Conducting intelligence operations in an active theater is no different. Meeting mission requirements entails the routine and collaborative efforts of intelligence personnel across echelons and, potentially, over significant geographic distances. During the 3^rdInfantry Division’s (ID’s) recent deployment to Victory North, V Corps’ area of operations (AO) in Poland and the Baltics, the division G-2 met this leadership challenge by establishing a federated intelligence reach relationship with its direct support intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) battalion (BN), the 103^rd, in Fort Stewart, Georgia. Establishing this type of relationship falls doctrinally within the task of conducting intelligence reach and its various subtasks as outlined in Appendix B of Field Manual 2-0, Intelligence.¹ By going one step further and federating the intelligence reach cell, 3^rd ID G-2 established a command and support relationship with the cell that ensured some capabilities remained dedicated to the mission for the duration of the deployment. The success of this approach required identifying intelligence requirements and allocating capabilities, deliberately leveraging the operations process, and actively involving leaders across organizations.

Identifying the various mission requirements and the necessary capabilities was a crucial component of the 3^rd ID G-2’s mission analysis more than three months before deployment. To ensure proper identification, the G-2 team completed a pre-deployment site survey and conducted routine working groups with the outgoing 4^th ID G-2. From this mission analysis, the 3^rd ID G-2 analysis and control element (ACE) identified the following mission requirements:

• Partner nation intelligence support through the Security Assistance Group–Ukraine.
• Exercise support leading up to and during European Command’s Austere Challenge 2024.
• Intelligence support to NATO regional defense planning.
• Intelligence security cooperation activities.
• Steady-state intelligence production to include maintenance of a common intelligence picture for an assigned area of responsibility from the V Corps G-2.
• Maintenance of a G-2 home-station mission command presence to provide intelligence support to one remaining brigade combat team.

Once the G-2 team assessed the capabilities necessary to meet these requirements, it determined that staffing for the division ACE, supplemented by augmenting capabilities from across the brigade military intelligence companies, was insufficient to meet all requirements.

The inability of a division ACE to meet its expected intelligence requirements in an active theater is a known capability gap for the Army; consequently, the Army allocates a direct support IEW BN to divisions. However, the 3^rd ID’s request for the 103^rd IEW BN to deploy in support of the mission in Europe was not granted because of other operational requirements. To meet the division’s mission needs the 3^rd ID G-2 team developed a course of action employing part of the 103^rd IEW BN through intelligence reach to support the division G-2’s forward deployment to Poland. Developing this course of action required determining whether the intelligence requirements could be executed through intelligence reach and, if so, whether the resulting intelligence products would be suitable for the mission. Because most intelligence requirements necessitated proximity to the source, intelligence reach support from the 103rd IEW BN would be limited primarily to significant augmentation of steady-state intelligence production, with only minor support for other requirements. With this assessment, the 3^rd ID G-2 ACE developed a detailed analysis of steady-state production requirements and the capabilities necessary to support them.

Establishing the Intelligence Reach Cell

To answer the 3^rd ID Commanding General’s priority intelligence requirements, the 3^rd ID G-2 ACE developed a weekly production cycle. The 103^rd IEW BN then completed a feasibility assessment based on this production requirement to determine the specific military occupational specialty roles, equipment, and facilities required to support the schedule. The assessment results indicated that the battalion could provide the necessary support with a cross-intelligence discipline reach cell comprising approximately 19 to 21 individuals while still maintaining their other operational requirements (Figure 1).

Based on the assessment, the 3^rd ID G-2 ACE determined that by leveraging the intelligence reach cell to complete most of its steady-state production requirements, the ACE could then surge to meet its other intelligence requirements in theater. As these requirements would persist throughout the division’s deployment, it was necessary to formalize this direct support relationship to allow portions of the division ACE to remain fully dedicated to other mission requirements.

The 3^rd ID G-2 and the 103^rd IEW BN collaborated on a fit-for-purpose request for support that enabled the 103^rd IEW BN to keep its necessary capabilities. The request was submitted through G-3 channels to the XVIII Airborne Corps for tasking the 525^th Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade (E-MIB) with the requirement to support. The 103^rd IEW BN, a subordinate headquarters of the 525^th E-MIB, was then formally tasked with directly supporting the 3^rd ID G-2 for the duration of its deployment using an intelligence reach cell with the capabilities to facilitate the weekly intelligence production. By leveraging this operations process, the 3^rd ID G-2 employed federated support from an intelligence reach cell and met its mission requirements.

As the 103rd IEW BN assembled the intelligence reach cell to support the 3^rd ID G-2, leaders from both organizations began positioning the cell to enable its long-term support. The battalion determined which personnel and equipment would provide the support. At the same time, the 3^rd ID G-2 ACE identified space adjacent to its home-station mission command personnel from which the intelligence reach cell would operate. Once established, the intelligence reach cell leadership developed a battle rhythm nested with that of the 3^rd ID G-2 ACE, training their personnel and gathering the necessary tools to begin production. Approximately one month before the 3^rd ID G-2 advance elements deployed, the intelligence reach cell acquired the necessary equipment and trained personnel to achieve initial operating capacity and began executing its mission. As the 3^rd ID G-2 advance elements transitioned with the 4^th ID G-2 in theater, the intelligence reach cell became fully operational and published its first weekly production requirement of three open-source summaries, two intelligence summaries, and one graphical intelligence summary.

Operating an Intelligence Reach Mission Team

Continued leadership engagement and routine production of after action reviews proved crucial to developing the final intelligence reach cell’s structure in a way that used talent most efficiently to meet all mission requirements (Figure 2). Throughout the intelligence reach cell’s support mission, the 3^rd ID G-2 ACE’s leadership and the intelligence reach cell’s officer in charge maintained an open dialogue about production requirements and refinements, which included a weekly synchronization meeting. Additionally, both the IEW BN commander and the intelligence reach cell officer in charge briefly joined the G-2 team at the forward-deployed location to assess the effectiveness of their support and make necessary adjustments.

The G-2 leadership provided guidance and implemented weekly production requirements for the intelligence reach cell. The schedule developed around these requirements had the team working Sundays through Thursdays. The daily battle rhythm of the intelligence reach cell included completing and sending products by 1700 on the day prior to the “required by” date because of the 6-hour time difference between their location in Fort Stewart, Georgia, and the forward-deployed G-2 in Europe. This allowed the 3^rd ID G-2 ACE to review and refine the products the following morning before publishing them. Once the forward team published the products, the intelligence reach cell reviewed any changes and used them to inform the development of subsequent products. The intelligence reach cell’s product schedule remained flexible to account for forward training exercises and leadership requests for information that required the intelligence reach cell to develop deep-dive products.

Lessons Learned

During the mission, several lessons and best practices contributed to the evolution of better processes, management, and structure of the intelligence reach cell.

Planning. Implementing an in-depth road-to-war discussion focused on the AO’s political, military, economic, and civil considerations will enable analysts to understand the context in which the forward team operates and help determine the best way to support it. To maintain contextual understanding, the intelligence reach cell analysts must remain synchronized with the division’s weekly operations through attendance at commander updates and routine review of the situation reports, the long-range training calendar, and the commanding general’s executive calendar. This synchronization enables a responsive intelligence reach cell to be more proactive in its production.

Staffing. Assigning a warrant officer or fusion noncommissioned officer to the team provides the experience and expertise necessary to orient and drive production.

Training. Planning should include courses on report writing, analytical research, product classification, command post computing environment, and specific courses for individual intelligence disciplines. This training enables intelligence reach cell analysts to work more efficiently with their division G-2 counterparts.

Equipping. Maintaining active accounts across the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), the tactical SIPRNET, the mission partner environment, and the battlefield information collection and exploitation system will ensure that all necessary systems are available.

Division Focused Open-Source Intelligence

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) has taken many forms throughout its employment in the Army, changing through litigation, nascent capability, and organizational redesign. Employment at the division level can quickly become redundant with theater (66^th Military Intelligence Brigade-Theater) and forward-deployed theater-servicing (519^th IEW BN/525^th E-MIB) OSINT. The 103^rd OSINT team, however, operated under U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and XVIII Airborne Corps authorities, solely supporting the 3^rd ID. To deconflict reporting and provide the best service to the division, the 3^rd ID G-2 provided AO-oriented geographic focus areas from which the 103^rd OSINT team provided reports. By focusing on open-source reporting in Poland and the Baltics, the OSINT team directly supported 3^rd ID’s priorities and operations, filling intelligence gaps where other intelligence disciplines lacked authority or international permissions to collect.

OSINT Stand-Up. In tandem with the stand-up of the intelligence reach capability, the 103^rd IEW BN established an OSINT program in support of and under the authorities of the 3^rd ID. The preconditions for conducting OSINT activities included:

• OSINT standard operating procedures (signed by the division G-2).
• OSINT collection plan (signed by the division G-2).
• OSINT risk assessment (signed by the division G-2).
• Authority to collect (FORSCOM and XVIII Airborne Corps memorandum signed by the respective G-2s).
• OSINT Basic Course mandated for all collectors.
• Army OSINT office memorandum with collection identification numbers for each collector.
• Compliance with Army Directive 2016-37, U.S. Army Open-Source Intelligence Activities; Department of Defense Manual 5240.01, Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities; and Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities (as amended by Executive Orders 13284 [2003], 13355 [2004], and 13470 [2008].
• Responsibility to publish to the entire intelligence community.

OSINT Outputs. OSINT production consisted of three weekly open-source summaries and infrequent OSINT reports driven by requests for information. As a fluid, rapidly changing intelligence discipline, OSINT has unique educational requirements for staff that may be unfamiliar or no longer keep abreast of emerging OSINT tools, limitations, and regulations. OSINT leaders have a responsibility to actively seek opportunities to inform leaders and commanders about the updated regulations and current suite of available tools that will satisfy requirements most effectively. The 103^rd OSINT products were among the most well-received products provided by the intelligence reach cell because of their timeliness and value in understanding public perceptions and the atmospherics within a given focus area.

Maximizing Collaborative Intelligence

The 3^rd ID G-2 met its mission requirements by developing a fit-for-purpose, federated intelligence reach cell in coordination with the 103^rd IEW BN. This federated intelligence reach cell resulted from a collaborative mission analysis with numerous stakeholders to identify mission requirements and allocate the appropriate capabilities. The formalization of this team through the operations process ensured its support to the 3^rd ID G-2 and enabled the massing of organic intelligence resources elsewhere within the division. Finally, the routine involvement of leaders from both organizations throughout the planning and operating of the intelligence reach cell ensured that it not only met mission requirements but continued to improve throughout its direct support to the division. This experience exemplifies leveraging external intelligence elements remotely while ensuring maximum collaboration to meet mission requirements.

Endnotes

1. Department of the Army, Field Manual 2-0, Intelligence (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office [GPO], 01 October 2023), B-9.

2. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 2-0, Intelligence (Washington, DC: GPO, 31 July 2019), 3-5.

3. Figure adapted from original by CW2 Wickham.

4. Figure adapted from original by CW2 Wickham.

MAJ Franklin G. Peachey is the brigade intelligence observer, coach, and trainer at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. He previously served as the analysis and control element chief for 3^rd Infantry Division’s (ID’s) deployment in support of U.S. Army Europe and Africa’s Operation Assure, Deter, and Reinforce. He holds a master of arts in diplomacy from Norwich University, along with master degrees from the Art of War Scholars Program and the School of Advanced Military Studies.

CPT William “Bill” Lairson most recently served as the multidomain officer for the 103^rd Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Battalion (IEW BN), 525^th Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade located in Fort Stewart, GA. He served as an infantry platoon leader, mortar platoon leader, and company commander for the 1^st ID in Fort Riley, KS while deploying to Germany and Poland. He holds a bachelor of science in education from the University of Akron.

CW2 Erik Wickham is an Army operations and integration technician who manages all-source intelligence training requirements and synchronizes 103^rd IEW BN operational requirements in support of 3^rd ID. His previous assignments include open-source Intelligence team chief for the 103^rd IEW BN; intelligence sergeant, 10^th Army Air and Missile Defense Command; South America noncommissioned officer in charge, 470^th Military Intelligence Brigade; and intelligence sergeant, 2^nd Squadron, 2^nd Cavalry Regiment.